


[Pdf free] Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941

Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941

Von David C. Evans, Mark Peattie
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Von David C. Evans, Mark Peattie : **Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941** before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941:

KundenrezensionenHilfreichste Kundenrezensionen1 von 1 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. DAS NachschlagewerkVon Axel Schillingber die Kaiserlich Japanische Marine.Besonders gefllt, dass nicht nur der WWII sondern die gesate Entwicklung seit der ffnung Japans dargestellt werden. Schiffbau, Taktik, Waffenentwicklungen etc. werden sehr anschaulich und verstdndlich abgehandelt.Sicher keine ganz leichte Kost, aber zum Thema gibt es

kaum etwas besseres als Informationsgrundlage.1 von 2 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich.

Fascinating Von Tom Munro Kaigun Strategy is a book that I had a lot of trouble putting down. This is perhaps strange for a book which discusses things such as the development of dry steam as a more efficient mode of propulsion, change in the composition of steel as it related to battleship construction and other very technical subjects. In a way the book said a lot about the Pacific War that had been said before. Yet in a way it was as startling revelation of the development of Japanese Society from the Meiji Restoration to the end of the second World War. The book is a discussion about the development of Japans Navy. Until 1945 the Japanese spent the staggering amount of 27% of their national budget on the navy. The reason for this lies with the now forgotten writings of Admiral Mahon. Mahon was an American who in his day was as famous as Marx and Lenin. He wrote a history of sea power a book that argued that the reason for the wealth of great nations was the control of an empire through control of the sea. The Japanese were converts to his doctrines and being an island power thought that the key to the national destiny was the acquisition of empire. Kaigun Strategy is a study of how the Japanese Navy tried to develop a navy that would give them preponderance over that of the much stronger American Navy. The book goes into great detail about how the Japanese studied the most modern technology to develop a numerically inferior but well trained modern Navy. The belief in empire and the need to ensure oil supplies put Japan on a collision course with the United States of America. The end of the war has led to Japan sheathing the sword and seeking to build up a strong economy. This has led to Japan becoming one of the richest and strongest countries in the world. How more productive that has been rather than putting most of the national wealth into a Navy which ended up on the bottom of the sea. The book is fascinating at showing that whilst a large amount of Japans planning and development showed tremendous skill and intellect, at the same time ridiculous errors were made. Thus whilst Japan build up a modern fleet and air wing it failed to: Adopt a convoy system during the war or to arm enough destroyers with sonar equipment to protect its merchant marine. Did not realise till after the war started that there were not enough tankers in the possession of Japan to move enough oil from its new possessions to keep both the navy and industry going. Made no attempts to develop code breaking in the way that its Axis Partner Germany and the Allies did. Were not able to adopt the strategy once it became obvious that the war was evolving into one of attrition rather than a single decisive battle. The book is a fascinating one and shows how the history of nations can be molded by the history of ideas.1 von 2 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Best in the field but be aware of a few blemishes Von T. Kuramatsu I have read the book from cover to cover to write a review for an academic journal. This is a great source of information for those who are interested in the Imperial Japanese Navy yet lacking Japanese language ability. Unfortunately there are a significant number of errors and factual mistakes (I made a rather lengthy list), which may be excusable given the size of the book (and I must say that most of them are minor details). For example, in 'Biographies of Prominent Naval Officers' of its appendix, a lot of appointment dates (years) are wrong and the quality of each entry differs significantly to the extent that it makes you wonder whether this was compiled by somebody other than the authors, since it sometimes contradicts the main text. This is disappointing since those (Western readers) who can make the best use of the book have no other source in English to check its details. Having said the above, the fact remains that this book is the best available to non-Japanese readers and a must for those who are seriously interested in the subject.

Kurzbeschreibung One of the great spectacles of modern naval history is the Imperial Japanese Navy's instrumental role in Japan's rise from an isolationist feudal kingdom to a potent military empire stridently confronting, in 1941, the world's most powerful nation. Years of painstaking research and analysis of previously untapped Japanese-language resources have produced this remarkable history of the navy's dizzying development, tactical triumphs, and humiliating defeat. Unrivaled in its breadth of coverage and attention to detail, this important new study explores the foreign and indigenous influences on the navy's thinking about naval warfare and how to plan for it. Focusing primarily on the much-neglected period between the world wars, David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, two widely esteemed historians, persuasively explain how the Japanese failed to prepare properly for the war in the Pacific despite an arguable advantage in capability.