


[Ebook free] Limits of Air Power (English Edition)

Limits of Air Power (English Edition)

Von Mark Clodfelter

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Von Mark Clodfelter : Limits of Air Power (English Edition) before purchasing it in order to gauge whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised Limits of Air Power (English Edition):

Kundenrezensionen Hilfreichste Kundenrezensionen 0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. Great reference material but flawed conclusion Von Ein Kunde Amazing how Mark Clodfelter, a School for Advanced Airpower Studies graduate, could draw the conclusion he did if he really did the research and understood combat air operations. The Vietnam War stopped being a simple insurgency by 1967 and became a full conventional war by 1968, with North Vietnamese Regulars doing most of the fighting, and requiring conventional artillery, rockets,

automatic weapons, and armored vehicles. To think that we could not have very quickly put North Vietnam on the full defensive at the beginning of 1968, had we followed Curtis LeMay's counsel to prosecute attacks on the 74+ strategic targets, particularly when North Vietnam had no significant air defenses, defies comprehension. The results from Linebacker I/II (in the face of one of the world's densest and most lethal air defense systems) proves the point. When the war was run by a competent president (Nixon) instead of an incompetent buffoon like LBJ (read Dereliction of Duty for details) the Air Force could bring Hanoi to its knees within weeks and could have saved tens of thousands of Army and Marine lives--the terrible hemorrhage American families still feel to this day. It is abominable that instructors at Maxwell read and believe this garbage and then teach it to Air Force officers going through courses at Air University.

0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. A FAR better book than the unkind review below suggests.

Von Ein Kunde This book isn't perfect. Several times I found myself thinking 'hmm, I don't think that's a fair conclusion', mainly because of the author's occasional unsustained assertion, hyperbole or sweeping generalisation. But heck, this book deals with a very contentious topic, so the author isn't going to please everyone anyway. The research is good, the argument compelling (even if not always agreeable) and the prose clear and engaging. In short, this is a good book. It's certainly much better than the anonymous reviewer from Montgomery, AL, suggests. I teach airpower, and I encourage my students to read this book. They shouldn't swallow it all hook, line and sinker, but they SHOULD read it.

0 von 0 Kunden fanden die folgende Rezension hilfreich. The limits of doctrine in face of reality

Von Ein Kunde An associate professor of history at the US Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado, Mark Clodfelter displays a huge knowledge of facts and figures as concerns the American bombing of North Vietnam. He masterly shows the connection between political and military factors conducive first to the failure in saving South Vietnam as an independent country, and later to helping the United States save their face when getting out of the trap. What is no less interesting from an up-to-date standpoint, the book also helps understand why the war of Kosovo was won by air power, and why not just so according to the three-day schedule envisaged by the NATO's high command.

Kurzbeschreibung The Limits of Air Power analyzes the American bombing campaigns in Vietnam and shows why the use of air power, so effective in previous wars, proved unsuccessful in a limited war. Major Mark Clodfelter, a military historian, assesses the American use of air power from World War II through the Vietnam War, and shows how its effectiveness declined in Vietnam when air commanders and political leaders were faced with a very different kind of conflict than they had previously experienced. During World War II there was a very clear military objective: destruction of the Axis powers, in which the critical role of air power culminated in the detonation of two atomic bombs over Japan. During the Korean War, the threat of aerial attacks against North Korean dams hastened that war's conclusion. But in Vietnam where the enemy fought a guerrilla war and was not dependent on supply lines, and where no industrial economy existed the threat of air power had less effect. The lessons learned from Vietnam, says the author, must become a part of Air Force doctrine going forward, and we ignore the lessons at our own peril. The New York Times praised The Limits of Air Power as a courageous book. . . . It will enlighten any citizen interested in knowing whether the Air Force is prepared to do its job.

Pressestimmen "[Clodfelter] has done us all a great favor with this book because he has stimulated thinking about our past and our opportunities for the future. He has graphically told the story of political indecision in the use of military force for limited objectives. I thank him for all of this and look forward to future books in his name." "Clodfelter's summary should be required reading for Air Force officers, politicians, and civilian theorists. Equally important, it will enlighten any citizen interested in knowing whether the Air Force is prepared to do its job." -- "New York Times," "[Clodfelter] has done us all a great favor with this book because he has stimulated thinking about our past and our opportunities for the future. He has graphically told the story of political indecision in the use of military force for limited objectives." -- "Airpower Journal," "Clodfelter's summary should be required reading for Air Force officers, politicians, and civilian theorists. Equally important, it will enlighten any citizen interested in knowing whether the Air Force is prepared to do its job." -- "New York Times," "[Clodfelter] has done us all a great favor with this book because he has stimulated thinking about our past and our opportunities for the future. He has graphically told the story of political indecision in the use of military force for limited objectives." -- "Airpower Journal," "Clodfelter's summary should be required reading for Air Force officers, politicians, and civilian theorists. Equally important, it will enlighten any citizen interested in knowing whether the Air Force is prepared to do its job." -- "New York Times" "[Clodfelter] has done us all a great favor with this book because he has stimulated thinking about our past and our opportunities for the future. He has graphically told the story of political indecision in the use of military force for limited objectives." -- "Airpower Journal" "Clodfelter's summary should be required reading for Air Force officers, politicians, and civilian theorists. Equally important, it will enlighten any citizen interested in knowing whether the Air Force is prepared to do its job." -- "New York Times" "[Clodfelter] has done us all a great favor with this book because he has stimulated thinking about our past and our opportunities for the future. He has graphically told the story of political indecision in the use of military force for limited objectives." -- "Airpower Journal"

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